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Environmental Law
by Travis M. Trimble *
In 2020,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
held that a provision of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)2 that tolled statutes of
limitation in state law claims did not apply to a claim brought under the
Price-Anderson Act (PAA),3 providing an exclusive federal cause of action
for harm resulting from exposure to radioactive materials, even though
the PAA “borrows” all substantive law governing liability, including a
relevant statute of limitation, from the law of the state where the harm
occurred.4 The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia found that an owner of land from which an unpermitted
discharge of dredged or fill material had occurred in violation of § 404 of
the Clean Water Act (CWA)5 could not be liable under the CWA for the
discharge where the owner played no active role in the discharge.6 The
court also decided that the diligent prosecution provision of the CWA is
a non-jurisdictional limitation on CWA citizen suits that may be raised
by a defendant in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.7 Finally,
the court granted motions for partial judgment on the pleadings to
defendants in two cases challenging the Army Corps of Engineers’
updated Master Manual, which governs its operation of its reservoirs in
* Partner in the firm of Burr & Forman LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georgia
(A.B.J., 1991); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1995).
Managing Editor, Mercer Law Review (1994–1995). Member, State Bars of Georgia and
North Carolina.
1 For an analysis of last year’s environmental law during the survey period, see Travis
M. Trimble, Environmental Law, 2019 Eleventh Circuit Survey, 71 MERCER L. REV. 1005
(2020).
2 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2018).
3 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2005).
4 Pinares v. United Technologies Corp., 973 F.3d 1254, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2020).
5 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1987).
6 Lambeth v. Three Lakes Corp., No. 1:19-CV-02602-ELR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
191347, at *19–*20 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 10, 2020).
7 South River Watershed Alliance Inc. v. DeKalb County, No. 1:19-cv-04299-SDG, 2020
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158261, at *11–*12 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 31, 2020).
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the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin and which allocates
more water from Lake Lanier in North Georgia to the water-supply needs
of metro Atlanta.8
In Pinares v. United Technologies Corp.,9 the Eleventh Circuit held
that CERCLA’s statute of limitations tolling provision10 did not apply to
claims brought under the federal PAA for injury resulting from the
plaintiff’s exposure to nuclear materials.11 CERCLA’s tolling provision
applies only to claims arising under state law, and therefore, the court
held, it did not toll the limitations period for an action under the PAA,
even though the PAA by its terms borrows all of its substantive
provisions establishing liability, including its statute of limitations, from
the law of the state where the injury occurred.12
In 1996, plaintiff Cynthia Santiago moved with her parents to a
residential subdivision called the Acreage in Palm Beach County,
Florida, when Santiago was four months old.13 The defendant owned a
tract of land ten miles away from the Acreage where it conducted
research and testing that over time contaminated the soil with
radioactive waste.14 Between 1993 and 2000, the defendant excavated
thousands of tons of the contaminated soil, which was eventually sold
and used as fill material for the construction of the Acreage. In 2009,
Santiago was diagnosed with a type of brain cancer. Her doctors
discovered the radioactive isotope thorium-230, which the plaintiffs
alleged was present in the fill material and in water runoff from the
defendant’s property, in Santiago’s spine at levels hundreds of times
above a normal background amount. Santiago and her parents filed suit
against the defendant in 2014, just after she turned eighteen. She
testified in her deposition that she was unaware of radioactive
contamination at the Acreage until 2014. She died from her cancer in
2016.15
Santiago’s lawsuit asserted three claims: wrongful death resulting
from negligence under Florida law, wrongful death from trespass under

In re ACF Basin Water Litigation, 467 F. Supp. 3d 1323, 1341 (N.D. Ga. 2020).
973 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2020).
10 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1) (1986).
11 Pinares, 973 F.3d at 1261.
12 Id. at 1262–63.
13 Id. at 1257.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 1257–58.
8
9
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Florida law, and damages under the PAA.16 An action under the PAA is
known as a “public liability action.”17
The PAA directs the district courts to “borrow” the substantive rules
of decision for a public liability action from the law of the state where the
injury occurred.18 The court also determined that this borrowing included
the relevant statute of limitation, which in this case the court said was
four years from the date the action accrued,19 which was the date of
Santiago’s cancer diagnosis: November 27, 2009. It was undisputed that
Santiago was not aware of radioactive contamination at the Acreage until
2014, and she filed her lawsuit on November 7, 2014.20 However, the
district court found that her causes of action accrued on November 27,
2009, the date of her cancer diagnosis, and therefore they were barred by
the four-year statute of limitation.21
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the four-year limitation period
was tolled by § 9658 of CERCLA.22 For claims arising under a state’s law
for injuries or damage caused by hazardous substances, pollutants, or
contaminants, § 9658 mandates a commencement date for the running of
the applicable state statute of limitation, that is the date Santiago

Id. at 1258.
Id. at 1259. The PAA creates a “public liability action” for harm arising out of a
“nuclear incident.” 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2). “Public liability” is any legal liability arising out
of or resulting from a “nuclear incident.” 42 U.S.C. § 2014(w). A “nuclear incident” is “any
occurrence . . . causing . . . bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death . . . arising out of or
resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of source,
special nuclear, or byproduct material . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2014(q). “Source material” includes
uranium and thorium. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(z). The PAA creates an “exclusive federal cause of
action for radiation injury.” Pinares, 973 F.3d at 1259. The action is termed a “public
liability action,” over which United States District Courts have original jurisdiction. In a
public liability action under the PAA, “the substantive rules for decision in such action shall
be derived from the law of the State in which the nuclear incident involved occurs, unless
such law is inconsistent with the provisions [of section 2210].” 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh).
18 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2).
19 FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(a), (g) (2018); see Pinares, 973 F.3d at 1259.
20 Pinares, 973 F.3d at 1258–59.
21 Id. at 1259.
22 Id. This code section provides in relevant part that for any action brought under state
law for personal injury or property damages caused by hazardous substances, if the date of
accrual of the cause of action, or commencement of the limitations period, applicable to the
state action is earlier than the “federally required commencement date” then the federally
required commencement date applies rather than the state commencement date. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9658(a)(1). The “federally required commencement date” is the date the plaintiff knew, or
reasonably should have known, that the injury or damage was caused by or contributed to
by the hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant. 42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(4)(A). If the
plaintiff is a minor, the federally required commencement date is the date the plaintiff is
deemed an adult under the state’s law. 42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(4)(B)(i).
16
17
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discovered, or should have discovered, that her injury was caused by the
hazardous substance, rather than an injury-in-fact date, as was the case
in the applicable Florida limitation period.23 Additionally, if the plaintiff
was a minor at the time of injury, CERCLA mandates a commencement
date for the state-law claim when the plaintiff becomes an adult.24 The
plaintiffs argued that under either tolling provision, Santiago’s claim was
timely.25
The court held that the Santiagos’ claims were barred by Florida’s
four-year statute of limitation.26 The court explained that the CERCLA
tolling provision, by its plain terms, applied only to actions brought under
state law, and that a public liability action for injury done by radioactive
contamination was exclusively a federal claim to which the CERCLA
provision did not apply.27 Furthermore, the PAA is the only cause of
action available to a plaintiff alleging injury caused by radiation.
Therefore, the Plaintiffs’ state-law claims alleging that Santiago’s cancer
was caused by thorium-230 were transformed into a “public liability
action” under the PAA, to which the CERCLA tolling provision did not
apply.28
In Lambeth v. Three Lakes Corp.,29 the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia, in a novel issue for the Eleventh
Circuit,30 concluded that the owner of land from which a discharge of
dredged or fill material occurred could not be liable under § 404 of the
Clean Water Act31 for failure to obtain a permit where the owner played
no active part in the work that resulted in the discharge.32
Plaintiffs own land and live adjacent to Lower Lake Forrest (LLF) in
Fulton County, Georgia. Defendant Three Lakes Corporation (TLC) is a
for-profit corporation that was created to hold title to and maintain three
lakes for the benefit of residents, including LLF.33 In that capacity, TLC

23 The plaintiffs did not point to any tolling provision that would have applied under
Florida law. Pinares, 973 F.3d at 1259–60.
24 42 U.S.C. § 9601.
25 Pinares, 973 F.3d at 1260.
26 Id. at 1261.
27 Id. at 1260.
28 See id. at 1260–61.
29 No. 1:19-CV-02602-ELR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191347 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 10, 2020).
30 See id. at *7.
31 33 U.S.C. § 1344. A permit issued by the Army Corps of Engineers is required for the
discharge of dredged or fill material into a water of the United States. 33 C.F.R. § 323.3(a).
“[W]aters of the United States” includes waterways and lakes, ponds and impoundments.
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a).
32 Lambeth, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191347, *7–*8.
33 Id. at *2.
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was also a part-owner of the LLF Dam. The City of Atlanta and the City
of Sandy Springs (City Defendants)34 were also part-owners of the dam
because they owned Lake Forest Drive.35
In 2009, the Georgia Environmental Protection Division determined
that the LLF Dam was a “high-hazard” dam because of the risks a breach
of the dam posed.36 In 2014, TLC learned that the City Defendants
intended to drain LLF in order to repair the LLF Dam. The City
Defendants provided TLC with its work plans, and in 2015 contractors
working for the City Defendants began work to drain LLF.37 At that
point, no defendant had obtained a § 404 permit for the work. TLC
“participated in the decisions about what to do” with the LLF Dam but
did not have “veto power” over the plans.38 On March 30, 2016, the City
Defendants’ contractors, using heavy equipment, began excavating the
LLF Dam and dredging LLF, breaching the dam and discharging
sediment-laden water downstream.39 TLC acknowledged that at this
time the City Defendants did not have the right to drain LLF without
obtaining a § 404 permit.40
The City Defendants obtained an after-the-fact Nationwide Permit
under § 404 from the Army Corps of Engineers for the dam repairs.41 The
permit stated that the area around the dam was “stabilized.”42 The
permit did not include TLC as a permitted party, and TLC never sought
to obtain a permit for itself or to become covered by the City Defendants’
permit. The dam repair project was never completed and LLF was never
restored. The sediment fill produced by the work in 2016 remained in
place at the time of the Court’s decision.43
In June 2019, the Plaintiffs filed suit against TLC and City
Defendants under the citizen-suit provision of the CWA44 for the
defendants’ failure to obtain a permit under § 404 for the discharge of
dredged or fill material into a water of the United States in connection
with the LLF Dam work.45
34 At the time of the District Court’s decision, the City Defendants had been voluntarily
dismissed by the plaintiffs. Id. at *2.
35 Id. at *2.
36 Id. at *2–*3.
37 Id. at *3.
38 Id. at *3–*4.
39 Id. at *4.
40 Id.
41 Id. at *4–*5.
42 Id.
43 Id. at *5.
44 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2018).
45 See Lambeth, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191347 at *5.
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The court granted TLC’s motion for summary judgment.46 The court
first concluded that the Plaintiffs’ lawsuit alleged “ongoing violations” of
the CWA,47 rejecting TLC’s argument that there were no ongoing
violations because the Corps had determined in 2016 that the area was
“stabilized.”48 The court explained that TLC did not explain what
“stabilized” meant in the context of this case.49 In any event, the court
found that the Plaintiffs alleged an ongoing violation of the CWA because
they presented evidence that, “the discharged pollutant remains and has
not been removed.”50
However, the court concluded second that TLC could not be liable for
violating the CWA because it was not a “discharger” under the CWA.51
The court noted that the CWA “imposes liability [for failure to obtain the
appropriate permit] on both the party who actually performed the work”
causing the discharge “and on the party with responsibility for or control
over the work.”52 The parties agreed that the City Defendants, through
their contractors, actually performed the work.53 “As such, the court’s
sole determination is if Defendant TLC is ‘responsible for’ or ‘controlled’
the work.”54
The material facts on this question were not disputed:
TLC (1) TLC owns the lake and the portion of the dam where the work
and CWA violations occurred; (2) admits that it was aware of and
participated in the decision making regarding the work which resulted
in violations of the CWA; (3) admits that as a dam owner and property
owner it is equally responsible for the dam project and the work done
in furtherance of the project; and (4) never sought or obtained a CWA
permit, nor did it secure coverage under any permit obtained by the
City Defendants.55

But also, “TLC (1) provided recommendations concerning the work to
the City Defendants which the City Defendants rejected, (2) did not have

Id. at *20.
The court noted that it had jurisdiction over a CWA citizen-suit action only if the
action alleged “‘ongoing or continuous violations, not . . . those that are wholly in the past.’”
Id. at *9 (citing Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1009 (11th Cir. 2004)).
48 Lambeth, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191347 at *9.
49 Id.
50 Id. at *10.
51 Id. at *11.
52 Id. at *12.
53 Id.
54 Id. (citing United States v. Lambert, 915 F. Supp. 797, 802 (S.D.W. Va. 1996).
55 Lambeth, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191347 at *12–13.
46
47
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the authority or ability to control or direct the City Defendants work, and
(3) ultimately, the City Defendants unilaterally decided to lower the level
of the lake.”56
The court found only one case from the Eleventh Circuit related to the
issue: Jones v. E.R. Snell Construction Inc.57 There, the Eleventh Circuit
held that a county was not a discharger of pollutants under the CWA in
connection with the widening of a state road where the county did not
own or maintain the road, and though it “played a role in obtaining the
allegedly faulty design” it also recognized problems with the design and
recommended changes to the Georgia Department of Transportation
(GDOT), which the GDOT rejected.58 The District Court noted that while
Jones had some similarities with the present case, the county in Jones
did not own the road, while TLC did partly own the LLF Dam.59
Ultimately, the court was persuaded by Froebel v. Meyer,60 a Seventh
Circuit case. In that case, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that
a county could not be liable for a discharge under the CWA caused by the
removal of a dam merely because it owned the land from which the
discharge occurred.61 The Froebel court explained that the language of
§ 404 and its regulations suggested that in order to be liable for a
non-permitted discharge, a defendant must engage in “‘active
conduct’ . . . that result[s] in the discharge of dredged or filled
material.”62
The District Court explained that, similar to Froebel, “there is no
evidence in the record that demonstrates the sort of ‘active conduct’ on
the part of Defendant TLC that would make it liable under the CWA.”63
“Defendant TLC did not perform the physical tasks nor did it direct,
enlist, or proposition the work . . . . Defendant TLC did not pay for the
work and . . . did not have the ability to control the manner in which it
was performed.”64 The court concluded that TLC’s partial ownership of
the dam, and its awareness that the work on the dam and lake performed
without a § 404 permit was a violation of the CWA, was insufficient to
make TLC liable as a discharger under the CWA.65
Id. at *13.
120 Fed. App’x. 786 (11th Cir. 2004).
58 Lambeth, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191347, *14–*15 (quoting Jones, 120 Fed. App’x. 786
at *5–*6).
59 Id. at *15.
60 217 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000).
61 Lambeth, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191347 at *18.
62 Id. at *18–19 (quoting Froebel, 217 F.3d at 939).
63 Id. at *19.
64 Id.
65 Id.
56
57
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In another CWA issue that has not been addressed by the Eleventh
Circuit, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia in South River Watershed Alliance Inc. v. DeKalb County66
concluded that the diligent prosecution bar to citizen suits67 under the
CWA is a non-jurisdictional limitation that can be raised via a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (Fed. R. Civ. P.) 12(b)(6).68 The court went on to rule that the
plaintiffs failed to plead facts that plausibly showed that the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Georgia Environmental
Protection Division (EPD) were not diligently prosecuting the violations
of the CWA alleged by the plaintiffs, and thus the plaintiffs’ claim was
barred.69
DeKalb County owns and operates a Water Collection and
Transmission System (WCTS) designed to collect and transport
wastewater to three treatment facilities in the area.70 The WCTS
operates according to an NPDES71 permit issued pursuant to the CWA
by the EPD. The permit requires the County to transport wastewater to
specified treatment facilities and treat the wastewater before
discharging it into surface waters. In 2010, the EPA and the EPD filed
an action against the County alleging that since 2006 the WCTS had
experienced numerous overflows of untreated wastewater that resulted
in discharges of sewage into the South River and the Chattahoochee
watersheds. In 2011, the parties entered into a Consent Decree that
required the County bring its WCTS into compliance with the CWA and
the Georgia Water Quality Control Act and to eliminate all sanitary
sewer overflows.72 More specifically, the Decree required the County to
rehabilitate the WCTS to eliminate overflows in “priority areas” that
required more immediate improvement by June 20, 2020.73 The Decree
required the rehabilitation of the WCTS in non-priority areas
(approximately sixty-nine percent of sewer lines in the WCTS) but
without a deadline.74
Plaintiff, a clean-water advocacy organization, filed a CWA citizen
suit against the County on July 15, 2019, alleging generally after the

No. 1:19-cv-04299-SDG, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158261 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 31, 2020).
33 U.S.C. § 1365. The “diligent prosecution” provision is at 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B).
68 South River Watershed Alliance Inc., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158261 at *12–*13.
69 Id. at *13–*14.
70 Id. at *1–*2.
71 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2019).
72 South River Watershed Alliance Inc., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158261 at *2–*3.
73 Id. at *4.
74 Id. at *4–*5.
66
67
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Consent Decree, the WCTS continued to discharge raw sewage into area
waters at a rate equal to or greater than prior to the Consent Decree in
violation of both the Consent Decree and the CWA.75 The County moved
to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, asserting the
“diligent prosecution” limitation on citizen suits.76 The County claimed
that the government parties to the Consent Decree, the EPA and the EPD
(the “agencies”), were “diligently prosecuting” the County’s alleged
violations of the CWA.77 Plaintiff contended that the Consent Decree was
insufficient to ensure the County’s compliance, and even if it were
sufficient, the agencies were not diligently prosecuting the County for its
ongoing violations.78
The court first concluded that the “diligent prosecution” provision
does not act to deprive a district court of subject matter jurisdiction over
a CWA citizen-suit claim, but the provision is an essential element of
such a claim.79 Therefore, a defendant could raise the diligent prosecution
bar to the claim in a motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule
12(b)(6).80 The district court followed the reasoning of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Louisiana Environmental Action
Network v. City of Baton Rouge,81 where the court held that because
Congress did not provide a clear statement that the diligent prosecution
bar is jurisdictional, the court would treat it as non-jurisdictional, and

Id. at *5–*6.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B), providing that a citizen suit may not be brought “if the
Administrator [EPA] or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or
criminal action in a court . . . to require compliance with the [CWA].” South River
Watershed Alliance Inc., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158261 at *11.
77 South River Watershed Alliance Inc., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158261 at *9.
78 Id.
79 Id. at *13.
80 Id. at *13–*14. It is worth noting that in South River Watershed Alliance, the issue
was not decided like a traditional 12(b)(6) motion would be. Ordinarily, the court would
look only at the contents of the complaint to determine if it stated a claim. In its motion to
dismiss, the County cited to documents outside the contents of the Complaint as evidence,
and the court accepted that evidence without converting the motion to one for summary
judgment, noting that the documents offered by the County were also the source of many
of the allegations in the Plaintiff’s complaint, and that the documents were public records,
of which the court could take judicial notice. Id. at *16–*17.
81 677 F.3d 737 (5th Cir. 2012). The Fifth Circuit opinion indicated the practical
significance of the difference: “If the [diligent prosecution] provision is not jurisdictional,
then [plaintiff] is protected by the safeguards of . . . 12(b)(6)—the district court is required
to accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view the facts in the light most
favorable to [plaintiff].” Id. at 745.
75
76
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further Rule 12(b)(6) governed the analysis of whether a CWA citizen suit
was barred by the diligent prosecution provision.82
The court then concluded that the diligent prosecution provision
barred the plaintiff’s citizen suit.83 The court found first that the Consent
Decree covered the same NPDES permit violations (ongoing discharge of
untreated wastewater) as the plaintiff’s complaint alleged, and therefore
the two actions concerned the same “standard, limitation or order” under
the CWA.84
The court next found that the plaintiff had not plausibly alleged a
lack of diligent prosecution by the agencies.85 The court noted that a
plaintiff alleging lack of diligent prosecution of a government
enforcement action faced a high bar: “[p]laintiffs must instead show that
the government’s actions are incapable of requiring compliance with the
applicable standards.”86 While the existence of the Consent Decree in and
of itself was insufficient to prove diligent prosecution,87 contrary to the
County’s assertion, the plaintiff’s allegations, while serious, were
insufficient to plausibly show that the agencies were not diligently
prosecuting the Consent Decree.88
The plaintiff contended the agencies’ prosecution of the Consent
Decree had not been diligent for five reasons: (1) repeated raw sewage
discharges from the WCTS; (2) the County’s failure to meet the 2020
deadline for bringing the WCTS into compliance with the Consent Decree
in priority areas; (3) the lack of a deadline for compliance in non-priority
areas; (4) fines that were too low to force compliance with its NPDES
permit; and (5) the County’s failure, with the agencies’ permission, to
implement a monitoring model required by the Consent Decree.89 The
court acknowledged the seriousness of the allegations,90 but nevertheless
82 South River Watershed Alliance Inc., 2020 U.S. Dist. 158261, at *12–*13 (discussing
La. Envtl. Action Network, 677 F.3d at 749).
83 Id. at *17. To determine whether a citizen suit is barred by the diligent prosecution
provision, the court must determine first whether a prosecution by a state or the EPA to
enforce the “same standard, order, or limitation” under the CWA was pending on the date
the citizen suit was filed. If so, the court must then determine whether the state or EPA
action was being “diligently prosecuted” at that time. Id.
84 Id. at *19–*20.
85 Id. at *20.
86 Id. at *20–*21.
87 Id. at *22.
88 Id. at *22–*23.
89 Id. at *23–*24.
90 Id. at *24. “Plaintiffs have identified serious problems with DeKalb’s WCTS that have
caused the ongoing discharge of raw sewage into public waterways . . . . Plaintiffs point to
evidence showing that, since entry of the Consent Decree, discharges from the WCTS into
watershed have not decreased in either priority or non-priority areas. Hundreds of separate
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concluded that they did not state a claim that the agencies were not
diligently prosecuting the Consent Decree.91 The court explained that a
defendant’s failure to abide by the terms of a consent decree did not prove
that the agency was not diligently enforcing the decree.92 Further, agency
choices as to the level of fines and steps they would allow the County to
take to comply with the Decree were within the agencies’ discretion and
entitled to deference from the Court.93
This case suggests a high bar for plaintiffs to overcome in order to
state a claim when pleading a claim under the CWA citizen-suit provision
where government agencies are prosecuting the same alleged violations
or where there is a consent order in place with respect to those violations.
The court acknowledged that over the nine years the Consent Decree had
been in place, discharges of raw sewage from the County’s WCTS had not
decreased, and yet the court did not deem this fact, even together with
other facts alleged by the plaintiffs, sufficient to plausibly suggest that
the agencies were not diligently enforcing the Consent Order.94 The court
explained that “[a] citizen-plaintiff cannot overcome the presumption of
diligence merely by showing that the agency’s prosecution strategy is less
aggressive than [the plaintiff] would like or that it did not produce a
completely satisfactory result.”95 But here, not only have the agencies’
enforcement strategy not produced a “completely satisfactory result,” it
has apparently produced no result at all.96 At one point in the case, the
court noted from persuasive authority, but did not further apply, the
principle that a citizen suit is proper where “there is a realistic prospect
that the violations alleged in its complaint will continue notwithstanding
the government-backed consent decree.”97 Here, though, the plaintiffs’
allegation that the County’s CWA violations continued apparently
unabated over nine years, it was insufficient to state a citizen-suit claim
sufficient to overcome the diligent prosecution bar.98
In In re ACF Basin Water Litigation,99 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted motions for partial
discharges occurred from July 2014 through April 2019, dumping millions of gallons of
untreated sewage into the watersheds.” Id. at *24–*25.
91 Id. at *25.
92 Id.
93 Id. at *26.
94 Id. at *24–*25.
95 Id. at *26.
96 Id.
97 Id. at *22–*23 (quoting Envtl. Conservation Org. v. City of Dallas, 529 F.3d 519, 528–
29 (5th Cir. 2008)).
98 Id. at *24–*25.
99 467 F. Supp. 3d 1323 (N.D. Ga. 2020).
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judgment on the pleadings to defendants in two separate claims that
challenge the Army Corps of Engineers’ Master Manual governing the
Corps’ operation of five reservoirs on the Chattahoochee River.100
This litigation is related to the Tri-State Water Rights litigation that
began in 1990.101 In that litigation, the Eleventh Circuit held in 2011 that
water supply was an authorized use of Lake Lanier.102 Based on that
decision, the Corps began the process of updating its Master Manual for
its reservoirs in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) River
Basin, including Lake Lanier, to accommodate Georgia’s request for
additional water supply from Lake Lanier for the Atlanta area. In 2017,
the Corps published the final version of its updated Master Manual and
a final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the Master Manual.103
The Master Manual included an increase in the amount of water from
Lake Lanier that could be used for Atlanta’s water supply.104 The EIS
showed potential impacts of the water supply allocation, including
reduced flows downstream, substantially adverse effects on fish and
aquatic resources in the Chattahoochee, and slightly to substantially
adverse impacts on the phosphorous, nitrogen, and dissolved oxygen
content in the Chattahoochee.105
Shortly thereafter, separate complaints were filed against the Corps
by a group of environmental advocacy organizations (Environmental
Groups)106 and by the State of Alabama.107 Relevant to the present case,
the Environmental Groups’ complaint alleged that the Corps violated
§ 2283(d)(1)108 of the Water Resources Development Act of 2007 (Count
II) because the Corps did not include a mitigation plan to address fish
and wildlife losses and other ecological harms, which the Environmental
Groups claimed the statute required.109 The Environmental Groups’

Id. at 1326.
The Atlanta Regional Commission maintains a page on its website providing an
overview of the Tri-State Water Rights Litigation. See Tri-State Water Wars Overview,
ATLANTA
REGIONAL
COMMISSION
(last
updated
February
2,
2021),
https://atlantaregional.org/natural-resources/water/tri-state-water-wars-overview/.
The
Atlanta Regional Commission is a defendant in the present case.
102 In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litigation, 644 F.3d 1160, 1166 (11th Cir.
2011).
103 In re ACF Basin Water Litigation, 467 F. Supp. 3d at 1329.
104 Id. at 1328.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 1329. “The National Wildlife Federation, the Florida Wildlife Federation, and
the Apalachicola Bay and Riverkeeper, Inc.”
107 Id. at 1328.
108 33 U.S.C. § 2283(d)(1) (2016).
109 In re ACF Basin Water Litigation, 467 F. Supp. 3d at 1330.
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complaint also alleged that the Corps violated the Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act of 1958110 (Count III) by failing to treat fish and wildlife
conservation as a “co-equal purpose” of the ACF reservoirs and by failing
to give those goals equal consideration as other project purposes
(navigation, hydropower, and water supply) in the Master Manual.111
Alabama’s lawsuit alleged that the Corps violated the CWA and the
Corps’ regulations and the Administrative Procedure Act (Counts III and
V) because the Master Manual as implemented would cause Georgia’s
water quality standards to be violated in portions of the Chattahoochee
River below Buford Dam on Lake Lanier.112
Several governmental parties in Georgia responsible for water supply
in municipalities and counties in the upper Chattahoochee river basin
intervened as defendants (the “Georgia Water Supply Providers”)113 and
these defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(c) as to Counts II and III of the Environmental Groups’ complaint
and Counts III and V of Alabama’s complaint.114
The court granted the Georgia Water Supply Providers’ motion as to
the Environmental Groups’ complaint.115 As to Count II, the issue turned
on language in § 2283(d)(1) of the Water Resources Development Act
stating that the Corps “shall not submit any proposal for the
authorization of any water resources project to Congress in any report,
and shall not select a project alternative in any report, [emphasis added]
unless such report contains” a specific plan to mitigate damages to
ecological resources.116 The Environmental Groups contended that the
Master Manual is a report within the meaning of the italicized clause,
and this language required the Corps to include a mitigation plan for
ecological harms caused by the increase in the amount of Lake Lanier’s
water allocated for water supply, which the Master Manual did not do.117
The court found the code section’s language to be ambiguous, but by
applying principals of statutory construction the court concluded that the
word “report” in the italicized clause meant “report submitted to
Congress,” just as in the clause before it.118 Because the Master Manual
16 U.S.C. § 661 (2019).
In re ACF Basin Water Litigation, 467 F. Supp. 3d at 1334.
112 Id. at 1336.
113 The Atlanta Regional Commission, the City of Atlanta, Cobb County-Marietta Water
Authority, DeKalb County, Forsyth County, Fulton County, the City of Gainesville, and
Gwinnett County. Id. at 1329.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 1334.
116 Id. at 1330.
117 Id. at 1331.
118 Id. at 1331–34.
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was not a report submitted to Congress, the Corps was not required to
include a mitigation plan.119
As to Count III, alleging that the Master Manual failed to treat fish
and wildlife conservation as a “co-equal purpose” of the reservoirs and
thus violated the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, the court concluded
that nothing in the Act placed a duty on the Corps to do so.120
The Court also granted the Georgia Water Supply Providers’ motion
for judgment on the pleading as to Alabama’s allegations in Counts III
and V that the Corps violated § 313(a)121 of the CWA because the Master
Manual as implemented would cause Georgia’s water quality standards
to be violated in certain parts of the Chattahoochee.122
Section 313(a) requires federal agencies to follow all legal
“requirements” for the abatement of water pollution, and to state a claim
under § 313(a), a claimant must allege that such a requirement has been
violated.123
The court concluded that Georgia’s water quality standards are not
“requirements.”124 The court noted that under Supreme Court of the
United States precedent, requirements that can be enforced against
federal agencies under § 313(a) “are limited to objective state standards
of control, such as effluent limitations in permits, compliance schedules
and other controls on pollution applicable to dischargers.”125 In contrast,
water quality standards “provide the legal basis for control decisions
under the Act” but “the water quality standards themselves” are not
enforceable.126 Thus, “[because] Alabama’s claim is based on the violation
of state water quality standards rather than a specific, enforceable, legal
‘requirement’ under § 313(a), Alabama has failed to state a claim under
33 U.S.C. § 1323(a).”127
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agencies “shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local
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122 In re ACF Basin Water Litigation, 467 F. Supp. 3d at 1338.
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